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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
KUNZ 8c COMPANY, dba KUNZ 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a 
California corporation, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, UTAH DEPARTMENT 
OF TRANSPORTATION, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
BRIEF OF DEFENDANT/APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
The Supreme Court of Utah has original appellate 
jurisdiction over this appeal from the declaratory judgment of 
the Fifth District Court under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(3) (j) (1996) . This Court has jurisdiction resulting from the 
Supreme Court's pour-over of the case to the Court of Appeals 
under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(4) (1996) . 
1 
Case No. 970216-CA 
Priority No. 15 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether the district court erred in basing its judgment 
on a supposed fact irrelevant to whether the area was zoned for 
the purpose of allowing outdoor advertising and which, in any 
event, does not exist. 
2. Whether, in view of the district court's clearly 
erroneous finding, this Court should declare the area Kunz 
proposes for signs ineligible for signs on the basis of law in 
effect at the time of the trial upon the second remand. 
3. Whether the district court erred in failing to consider 
specific factors the Court of Appeals directed it to consider, 
and other relevant factors, in determining whether the property 
is zoned for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising. 
4. Whether the district court erred in disregarding as 
unworkable Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995) after the Court 
of Appeals had identified that subsection as controlling and 
directed the trial court to follow it. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue No. 1 is a question of adequacy of the trial court's 
2 
findings, reversible for clear error. Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (findings must show that court's judgment 
follows logically from and is supported by evidence). (R. 769.) 
Issue No. 2 is a question of law or correct application 
of law, and is reviewable without deference to the district 
court's determination. United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park 
Citv Co.. 870 P.2d 880, 885 (Utah 1993). (R. 705-16.) 
Issue No. 3 is, as to factors the Court of Appeals 
specifically directed the District Court to consider, a question 
of law and is reviewable without deference to the district court. 
Slatterv v. Covey & Co.. Inc..909 P.2d 925 (Utah App. 1995). (R. 
861, 874, 875, 878, 924, 978, 981, 985, 986, 987.) As to other 
relevant factors, the issue is one of adequacy of the trial 
court's factual findings, which are reversible where clearly 
erroneous. Acton v. Deliran. 737 P.2d at 999. (R. 1043, 855-56, 
876, 882-83, 902, 947.) 
Issue No. 4 is a question of law or correct application of 
law and is reviewable for correctness. Slattery v. Covey & Co. , 
Inc., 909 P.2d at 925; United Park City Mines Co. v. Greater Park 
3 
City Co.. 870 P.2d at 885. 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
The following authorities are believed by Appellant to be 
determinative of certain issues presented in this appeal and are 
supplied in Addendum A: 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.2(1995) 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995) 
Utah-Federal Agreement (incorporated by reference in 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.2) 
Utah Administrative Code, R933-2-1(1994) 
Utah Administrative Code, R933-2-3(4) (1994) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF CASE AND DISPOSITION BELOW 
This is a declaratory judgment action on remand concerning 
pristine and scenic land adjacent to 1-15 in the town of 
Toquerville, Washington County, Utah. The fundamental question 
is whether it is unlawful to place outdoor advertising billboards 
on this land.1 The background for this case is essentially 
Addendum B hereto consists of copies of four photographs 
that were UDOT's Exhibits 8, 11, 12, and 13. The photographs 
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provided in the Utah Court of Appeal's recitation in its decision 
on the prior appeal reported in Kunz & Co. v. State of Utah, 913 
P.2d 765 (Utah App. 1996) (attached hereto as Addendum C for 
reference). Included in the Court of Appeal's introductory 
statement is the following: M[I]n November of [1993], the town 
of Toquerville annexed Eveleth's property and chose to retain the 
'highway commercial' zoning for the area. However, there is not 
now, nor has there ever been, any commercial development on the 
property other than the three billboards." Lei. at 767. 
Three large billboards had been erected on the property 
prior to the Toquerville annexation by a predecessor sign company 
to Kunz. (R. 198, 593-94, 645.) The Court of Appeals held the 
signs "illegal and subject to removal because Kunz [had] not 
obtained valid permits for the signs." id. at 770. Still, the 
appellate court remanded a second time to the Fifth District 
Court, to determine whether, in view of the stated purpose of the 
show the view of the area of the signs from the eastern lane of 
the divided highway of 1-15 looking west with the sign posts 
visible (Exhibit 8) and a closer view of the area of each of the 
three sign posts. (Exhibits 11, 12, and 13). 
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Utah Outdoor Advertising Act to preserve "natural scenic beauty 
of the lands bordering on the highways," the land was "zoned for 
the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising" as 
prohibited by the Act, and for that reason ineligible as a 
location for billboards. Utah Code Ann. §§ 27-12-136.2 and 
27-12-136.3(3)(1995). 
The district court ruled the land was not "zoned for the 
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising," basing its 
decision on the existence of conditional use permits for the 
signs. (R. 769 -- Fifth District Court Findings of Fact, 
Addendum C, HU 9 and 10.) There was, however, no evidence of the 
issuance of any conditional use permit for any of the signs. 
The Court of Appeals had specifically directed the district 
court to consider "evidence of actual land use or any evidence 
that the zoning body merely perpetuated a prior zoning 
designation." Xd. at 769. And the district court did find that 
the "only use of the . . . property since [erection of the signs] 
in 1987 has been for outdoor advertising signage." (R. 768 --
Fifth District Court Findings of Fact, Addendum D, %% 3 and 4). 
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However, the court disregarded that finding as irrelevant to its 
resolution of the case. Further, the district court entered no 
finding at all on perpetuation of the prior zoning designation, 
despite the existence of evidence thereon. The district court 
then entered a declaratory judgment that the area was not zoned 
for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising and hence 
signs in that area would not be unlawful. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS AND COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The factual background of the case prior to the district 
court bench trial on October 1, 1996 is provided by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Kunz & Company v. State of Utah. 913 P.2d 
765. Consistent therewith, and supplementing with material based 
on the trial and subsequent court-issued documents, this further 
factual statement is provided. 
Until the sign faces were removed under Court order in 1996, 
the outdoor advertising signs now owned by Appellee Kunz stood 
for over eight years on land adjacent to 1-15 in Washington 
County. Kunz & Co. v. State of Utah. 913 P.2d 765. There has 
never been any commercial activity on the land other than the 
7 
signs. (R. 768 -- Fifth District Court Findings of Fact, 
Addendum D, HH 3 and 4; R. 861 11 11-15, R. 874 11 14-25 and R.
 ; 
875 11 1-22, R. 878 1 25 and R. 879 1 22, R. 923 11 18-25 and R. 
924 11 1-19, R. 978 11 24-25 through R. 981 1 1, R. 985 11 21-25, 
R. 986 11 1-25, and R. 987 11 1-10.) The issue at the trial on 
remand was whether Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) and related 
law barred re-erection of billboards on that land. 
Tracking the zoning and annexation of the land, in 198 9, 
Washington County changed the zoning from "agricultural" to 
"highway commercial" at the urging of the landowner (Eveleth). 
(R. 198-199, 222-245, 253, 592, 594.) Later, the Toquerville 
Town Council annexed the land in question and perpetuated the 
same "highway commercial" zoning classification of the property 
that it had while its status was part of the unincorporated area 
of the county. (R. 595; Kunz & Co. v. State of Utah, 913 P.2d at 
767; R. 985 11 9-21, R. 989 11 4-13, R. 990 11 20-24.) As noted, 
it was also at the request of Eveleth, the owner of the land on 
which the signs stood and would stand, and who was the lessor of 
the land to the sign company, that the land was annexed by 
8 
Toquerville. (R. 855 11 24-25 and R. 856 11 1-9, R. 876 11 1-25 
and R. 877 11 1-12, R. 882 11 16-25 and R. 883 1 1.) 
On August 7, 1989, the Utah Department of Transportation, 
District Five held a sign hearing regarding the three signs 
pursuant to UDOT's notice of violation. (R. 247-251, 594.) UDOT 
entered an order dated August 25, 1989 ruling the three signs 
unlawful. The then sign owner (Lundgren) appealed the UDOT 
order. (R. 199, 594.) It was during the pendency of the Appeal 
that the zoning of the property in question was changed to 
"highway commercial" by Washington County, and upon being 
informed of this fact by UDOT, the Utah Court of Appeals remanded 
to the agency for consideration of the rezoning and its effect, 
if any. (R. 199, 200, 253, 594.) 
On February 25, 1993, UDOT entered its "Order on Remand 
Revoking Permits and for Removal of Signs." On January 18, 1994, 
Kunz made application for renewal permits for the signs, which 
application UDOT denied. (R. 595.) On February 16, 1994, Kunz 
filed an action in the Fifth District Court for a declaratory 
judgment regarding its alleged right to sign permits. (R. 595.) 
9 
Kunz did not, however, seek a UDOT administrative hearing. Kunz 
and UDOT filed cross motions for summary judgment, the District 
Court granting Kunz's motion for summary judgment and denying the 
motion of UDOT. (R. 600-02.) UDOT appealed. 
On March 14, 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals reversed and 
remanded, holding that the signs were "illegal" (913 P.2d at 
770), but directing the trial court to conduct inquiry into the 
purpose of the zoning in light of the essential purposes of the 
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, including inquiry regarding 
"evidence of actual land use." (i£l. at 769.) 
On October 1, 1996, the Fifth District Court conducted a 
bench trial pursuant to the remand, after which it entered 
judgment in favor of Appellee Kunz. (Addendum E.) The trial 
proceeding and court-issued documents established the following 
facts: 
1. The district court based its decision on the existence of 
Toquerville conditional use permits for the signs, the court 
stating as follows: 
Due to the fact that placement of outdoor advertising 
signs within the Eveleth property . . . could only be 
10 
done by conditional use permit, the Court cannot find 
that the primary purpose of the zoning was to allow 
outdoor advertising signage. 
(R. 769.) However, no evidence was submitted that conditional 
use permits were obtained. In fact, the Toquerville ordinance 
limited "highway commercial" signs under the conditional use 
permit process to a maximum size of eight feet by twelve feet 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 2), and each of the proposed Kunz signs is 
14 feet by 48 feet. (R. 664-66) 
2. The land adjacent to the highway on which Kunz wishes to 
place the three billboards is natural and scenic, has never had 
any commercial use, other than the signs, and has no utilities to 
service commercial usage. This is shown by photos admitted in 
evidence. (Defendant's Exhibits 5-13) and comment thereon at R. 
1003-04, 1027-28.) It is also evidenced by unrebutted testimony, 
of which the following is typical: UQ: At the time of the 
annexation, there was no culinary water or sewer to the area 
where the signs are; is that correct? A: That is correct." (R. 
874 11 14-16; see also R. 924 11 1-19); "Q: Without water and 
sewer up there, commercial development is not feasible; is that 
11 
correct? A: That's correct. There would have to be utilities 
available for a commercial development." (R. 875 11 2-5.)) 
It was stipulated that the following description of the land 
given by the court was accurate: 
[I]f one were to stand on the 1-15 freeway near the 
area of the signs and look west and northwest, you 
would see basically sage and pinion foliage extending 
for some miles uninterrupted by presence of human 
activity at all. 
As a backdrop to that sage and pinion foliage, you 
have the western face -- no, take that back -- eastern 
face of the Pine Valley Mountains, which constitutes 
the horizon west and northwest of the area of the 
signs, and that it is with the exception of the 
freeway, itself, in that location without any other 
indication of human activity. 
(R. 879 11 14-25. ) 
After testifying that he had lived in the area for more than 
30 years and had gone by the area "all the time. Almost daily" 
(R. 979 1 12), former Toquerville Mayor Charles Wahlquist 
responded to questions as follows: 
Q. Have you ever seen any commercial activity in the 
area right where the signs are other than the signs? 
A. No. 
Q. Has there ever been any culinary water service run 
up to the area where the signs are? 
A. No, not to my knowledge. 
Q. Has there ever been any sewer service run to that 
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area where the signs are? 
A. No. There's no sewage up there at all. We had 
talked with the sewer district to get some, but there 
isn't any present. 
Q. Without culinary water or sewage, commercial 
development in that area cannot reasonably be done; 
isn't that correct? 
A. Correct. 
Also, the distance from the closest of the three signs to 
the intersection with 1-15 is approximately 2000 feet. (R. 1024 
11 2-5.) If any commercial development were to occur in the 
area, it would first be placed right at the intersection (R. 923 
11 19-25, R. 924 11 1-3, R. 959 11 9-24), and no commercial 
development has occurred even there. (Id.) 
3. The district court ruled inadmissible as irrelevant, 
proffered testimony of Toquerville's own zoning expert, that 
"based on the standards of zoners[,] taking into account the 
nature of the pristine area with its beauty where the signs are 
[,] . . .he would not recommend that outdoor advertising signs 
be placed there, that he would recommend that they not be placed 
there." (R. 999 11 13-19. ) 2 The trial court did, however, 
2The testimony was offered to show that signs at this 
location would violate the stated purpose of the act to promote 
13 
receive without objection testimony that the zoning expert and 
his colleagues "wanted to retain a more natural looking corridor 
entering into the St. George basin" (R. 934 11 24-25, R. 935 1 
1), but assumed since the three signs were already erected "that 
we might have to live with" them. (R. 935 11 3-4.) And it did 
receive without objection testimony from one of Kunz's witnesses 
that a gentleman interested in developing the land in the general 
area "was very adamant about not having those signs there" 
because "he thought that would be an eyesore and that it should 
be left in its natural pristine condition." (R. 878 11 13-14, 
22-24. ) 
4. Toquerville's first interest in the annexing and zoning 
of the land was "tax revenue of the Town of Toquerville." (R. 
947, 11 13-17. See also R. 367, 11 9-11 (of three issues, number 
11
 [o] ne is always to do with money, who pays what taxes in the 
the "enjoyment of public travel, to protect the public investment 
in such highways, [and] to preserve the natural scenic beauty of 
lands bordering on [the] highways" (Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-
136.2), in light of which § 27-12-136.3(3) must be read, under 
the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
14 
county versus the city"); R. 902 11 8-11 (referring to "the 
potential tax base benefits that commercial development at the 
interchange would bring to the Toquerville Town").) The only 
commercial activity on the property annexed at the request of 
Eveleth, the lessor of the land to the sign company, that has 
ever existed to pay taxes to Toquerville is billboards Kunz now 
seeks to reerect. 
5. The district court disregarded as unworkable the Code 
section the Utah Court of Appeals had identified as controlling 
and directed the District Court to follow. The district court 
stated as follows: 
I observe parenthetically that the legislative use 
within 27-12-136.3 sub 3 of the phrase primary purpose 
of allowing outdoor advertising probably does not 
accomplish the intent -- the announced intent of the 
act or give any kind of reasonable framework within 
which courts may determine issues of these kinds. 
I would suspect that it would be a rare case if 
the Court could find evidence that the primary purpose 
was to build billboards. 
(R. 1068 11 1-5.) 
Thereupon the district court granted declaratory judgment in 
favor of Kunz. (Addendum E -- Order.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court erroneously based its judgment on a supposed 
fact irrelevant to whether the area is zoned for the primary 
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising and which, in any event, 
does not exist. Though the district court relied on the supposed 
issuance of Toquerville conditional use permits for the signs, no 
evidence of the issuance of conditional use permits was 
submitted, and the Toquerville ordinance limits signs to a size 
far smaller than Kunz's proposed billboards. 
The signs Kunz proposes to erect would be unlawful because 
they cannot meet current requirements for valid permits, 
including compliance with State and federal statutes, UDOT rules 
and the Toquerville ordinance limiting signs to 8 feet by 12 
feet. 
The Utah Court of Appeals directed the district court to 
consider certain specific factors and other evidence as to 
whether the billboards would be in an area "zoned for the primary 
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising." These factors included 
"actual land use" and whether the zoning body perpetuated the 
prior zoning designation of Washington County that the Court of 
16 
Appeals had ruled failed to justify the area for billboards under 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3). The district court, however, 
failed to consider any such factors, disregarding the 
overwhelming evidence that the land was natural, beautiful and 
scenic without any commercial incidents absent the signs and 
rendering no finding on any other such evidence. 
The lower court went so far as to describe the controlling 
section of law the Court of Appeals had discussed and directed 
the lower court to apply, as essentially unworkable. The 
district court's errors require this Court to vacate the lower 
court judgment and hold that the area in question is ineligible 
for outdoor advertising signs. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN BASING ITS JUDGMENT ON A 
SUPPOSED FACT IRRELEVANT TO WHETHER THE AREA WAS ZONED FOR 
THE PRIMARY PURPOSE OF ALLOWING OUTDOOR ADVERTISING AND 
WHICH, IN ANY EVENT, DOES NOT EXIST 
As noted above, the district court found as follows: 
Due to the fact that placement of outdoor advertising 
signs within the Eveleth property . . . could only be 
done by conditional use permit, the Court cannot find 
17 
that the primary purpose of the zoning was to allow 
outdoor advertising signage. 
(R. 769.) 
This supposed fact, however, has nothing to do with the 
question whether the area was zoned for the primary purpose of 
allowing outdoor advertising. Further, Kunz tendered no evidence 
to show that Toquerville had issued conditional use permits for 
the signs. Indeed, the Toquerville ordinance limits "highway 
commercial" signs under the conditional use permit process to a 
maximum size of 8 feet by 12 feet (Plaintiff's Exhibit 2), and 
each of the proposed Kunz signs is 14 feet by 48 feet. (R. 664-
66. ) 
Thus, the trial court's judgment is fatally flawed on the 
ground that the court's findings do not show that the court's 
judgment follows logically from and is supported by evidence. 
See Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d at 999. The district court 
judgment is erroneous and should be reversed. 
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II. SINCE THE SIGNS WERE DECLARED *ILLEGAL" BY THE COURT OF 
APPEALS FOR HAVING NO VALID PERMITS AND SINCE THE 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGMENT BASED ON CONDITIONAL USE 
PERMITS IS ERRONEOUS, THIS COURT SHOULD FINALLY DECLARE 
THE AREA PROPOSED FOR THE SIGNS AS INELIGIBLE FOR 
SIGNS ON THE BASIS OF LAW IN EFFECT AT THE TIME OF THE 
TRIAL UPON SECOND REMAND 
The Utah Court of Appeals declared the signs on the land in 
issue "illegal and subject to removal" because Kunz had not 
obtained valid permits for the signs. Kunz & Co. v. State of 
Utah, 913 at 770. That decision was not appealed. Pursuant to 
that decision, and after Kunz;s motion for injunctive relief to 
prevent removal of the signs was denied by the District Court (R. 
615-68.), the sign faces were removed.3 
Since after the Court of Appeals declared the signs 
"illegal" Kunz had no vested rights to signs at the disputed 
location, Kunz would thereafter have to comply with all existing 
statutes and rules to qualify the three proposed signs for UDOT 
sign permits. Also, the district court's declaratory judgment on 
the second remand based on the supposed existence of Toquerville 
3Though UDOT could have required removal of the entire sign 
structures, as a courtesy to Kunz, UDOT allowed Kunz to remove 
the sign faces only, until final resolution. 
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conditional use permits was erroneous inasmuch as no evidence was 
submitted to show that conditional use permits even existed. 
Thus, this court can write on a clean slate and finally end this 
odyssey without further remand by declaring the area unlawful for 
signs on the basis of a clarifying rule in effect at the time of, 
and urged at, the trial. (R. 708-09.) 
That rule is R933-2-3(4)(1994) of the Utah Administrative 
Code. The rule clarifies the definition in Utah Code Ann. § 27-
12-136.3(3) (1995) that was otherwise considered ambiguous, in 
the following language: 
(4) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of 
outdoor advertising" as used in subsection 27-12-
136.3(3) of the Act is defined to include areas in 
which the primary activity is outdoor advertising. 
"It is the settled rule that the practical interpretation of 
an ambiguous or doubtful statute that has been acted upon by 
officials charged with its administration will not be disturbed 
except for weighty reasons." Brewster v. Gage, 280 U.S. 327, 336 
(1930) (upholding a challenged federal regulation). See also 
Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.6(1995)(granting to UDOT the power to 
make rules). Thus, the area in question is unlawful for signs 
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inasmuch as it is undisputed that the area is. one "in which the 
primary [only] activity is outdoor advertising." Utah 
Administrative Code R933-2-3(4) (1994). 
III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER 
SPECIFIC FACTORS THE COURT OF APPEALS DIRECTED IT TO 
CONSIDER AND OTHER RELEVANT FACTORS IN DETERMINING 
WHETHER THE PROPERTY IS ZONED FOR THE PRIMARY PURPOSE 
OF ALLOWING OUTDOOR ADVERTISING 
The district court's failure to follow this Court's 
instruction to consider certain factors violates the legal 
principle of law of the case. The principle is stated in 
Slattery v. Covey & Co. Inc., 909 P.2d 925, 928 (Utah App. 1995), 
as follows: 
[A] ny definitive ruling by an appellate court becomes 
the "law of the case, and the trial court is bound to 
follow it, even though it considers the ruling 
erroneous." fStreet v. Fourth Judicial District Court. 
113 Utah 60, 191 P.2d 153, 158 (1948).] The Utah 
Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed this principle. 
In Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d 1034 (Utah 
1995), the court stated that "pronouncements of an 
appellate court on legal issues . . . become the law of 
the case and must be followed in subsequent proceedings 
. . . the lower court must implement both the letter 
and the spirit of the mandate, taking into account the 
appellate court's opinion and the circumstances it 
embraces." I&. at 1037-38 (citations omitted). . . . 
The relevant factors the lower court failed to consider will 
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be discussed individually. 
A. Failure to Consider Actual Land Use, i.e., No Commercial 
Incidents and the Natural, Scenic Beauty of the Lands 
Bordering the Highway (Absent the Signs) 
If this Court considers it necessary to go beyond the 
district court's error coupled with R933-2-3(4) as a basis on 
which to determine the area is ineligible for signs, the Court 
should reverse based on the district court's failure to consider 
factors the Utah Court of Appeals directed it to consider. The 
Court of Appeals recognized the limitations of subjective 
statements of intent as to whether or not, under subsection 27-
12-136.3(3), an area was zoned for the primary purpose of 
allowing outdoor advertising. It therefore directed the district 
court to consider "not just the stated purpose of the zoning or 
local government," but all "relevant evidence" including 
"evidence of actual land use or any evidence that the zoning body 
merely perpetuated a prior zoning designation." Kunz & Co. v. 
State of Utah, 913 P.2d 769. 
Thus, the first and most important objective element the 
Court of Appeals directed the district court to consider was 
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"actual land use." Id. The reason for focusing on actual land 
use, as stated by the appellate court, is that the Act explicitly 
states its purpose to include preservation of "the natural scenic 
beauty of lands bordering on [the] highways," and therefore 
"allowing outdoor advertising in areas without other businesses 
or highway services in the vicinity would violate essential 
purposes of the . . . Act." J&. The Court of Appeals quotation 
of the Act's statement of purpose as a background against which 
it read section 27-12-136.3(3) is consistent with settled law 
that "[i]n order to give a statute its true meaning and 
significance it should be considered in the light of its 
background and the purpose sought to be accomplished . . . ." 
Snyder v. Clune. 15 Utah 2d 254, 255, 390 P.2d 915, 916 (1964).4 
4These purposes are consistent with Utah Rule, the Utah-
Federal Agreement (incorporated by reference in Utah Code Ann. § 
27-12-136.2 and included in Appendix A and the record at R. 741-
751), and the Federal Highway Beautification Act. In Rule R933-
2-1 of the Utah Administrative Code it is provided that 
11
 [N] othing in these rules shall be construed to permit outdoor 
advertising that would disqualify the State for Federal 
participation of funds under the Federal Standards applicable." 
The Federal Standards include the Utah-Federal Agreement, "the 
purpose of [which] is to promote the reasonable, orderly, and 
effective display of outdoor advertising while remaining 
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It cannot be determined whether those purposes are being 
violated without considering whether the area has a natural, 
scenic and beautiful character to preserve. "Actual land use," 
therefore, includes use as a natural, scenic, beautiful setting 
for the highway. 
"Actual land use" includes the presence or absence of , 
commercial usage, such as commercial buildings and services such 
as water, sewer and electricity. A solely pristine and scenic 
use militates against the lawfulness of the area for billboards, 
given the policy of the Act, whereas substantial incidents of 
consistent with the national policy to protect the public 
investment in interstate and primary highways, to promote the 
safety and recreational vali of public travel and to preserve 
natural beauty . . . " Utah— ^deral Agreement (emphasis added). 
Under the Utah-Federal Agreement, Utah agreed "to implement and 
carry out the provisions of Section 131 of Title 23, United 
States Code, and the national policy in order to remain eligible 
to receive the full amount of all federal highway funds . . . ." 
23 U.S.C. § 131(b) (1994) directs the withholding of a state's 
fur.ds when the state is not in compliance. The Federal Highway 
Administration (FHWA), through its Utah right-of-way officer, 
stated in his affidavit that since the three proposed signs at 
Anderson Junction violate the Federal policy governing outdoor 
advertising, he has advised the Utah Department of Transportation 
that unless these three signs at Anderson Junction are removed, 
he will recommend to the FHWA withholding of a portion of Utah's 
Federal Highway Funds. (R. 571-573.) 
24 
non-billboard commercial usage would militate in favor of the 
lawfulness of the area for billboards, showing that the primary 
purpose served by the zoning was not allowing outdoor 
advertising. 
The appellate court was not directing the district court to 
engage in the purely academic exercise of looking at "actual land 
use" and then, after finding that use to be solely natural and 
scenic without any commercial incidents, to dismiss the finding 
as irrelevant to its resolution of the case. Nor was the 
appellate court directing the district court to refuse even to 
consider the "natural scenic beauty of the land[ ] bordering on 
the highway[ ]." Yet this is precisely what the district court 
on remand did. 
Evidence was replete and uncontradicted that the area of the 
signs was natural, scenic and beautiful, with no commercial 
incidents, and therefore subject to preservation under the policy 
of the Act. This evidence is marshaled above in the Statement of 
Facts in its subparts 2 and 3. Yet the trial court failed to 
conform its judgment to the logical conclusion to which that 
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evidence pointed. This failure in disregard of the direction of 
the Utah Court of Appeals is error. 
B. Failure to Consider Perpetuation of Zoning for 
Signs 
The Court of Appeals directed consideration of "any evidence 
that the zoning body merely perpetuated a prior zoning 
designation," 913 P.2d at 769, as a factor bearing on whether, in 
reality, the area was "zoned for the primary purpose of allowing 
outdoor advertising." Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3). The 
Washington County zoning as "commercial" had been determined by 
the UDOT Order on Remand to be for the primary purpose of 
allowing outdoor advertising, thereby rendering the area of the 
signs unlawful for signs. (R. 461-64.) And the Court of Appeals 
held that Kunz was bound by that UDOT Order on jhe ground of res 
judicata. 913 P.2d at 769. The Court of Appeals therefore 
reasonably determined that to perpetuate the zoning designation 
already held to render the area unlawful for signs would also 
perpetuate the unlawfulness of the area for signs. 
Moreover, evidence that Toquerville perpetuated the prior 
Washington County zoning designation was adduced, but the 
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district court made no finding based on it. This was error. 
Planners indicated they considered several factors before 
the annexation and zoning. Kenneth Sizemore, a witness for Kunz, 
stated that they looked at "existing zoning of Washington 
County," "owner's desires" and "tax base benefits that commercial 
development at the interchange would bring to Toquerville town." 
(R. 902.) The second two of these three considerations are 
treated below and support the conclusion the property was zoned 
for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising. The 
first is relevant here, however, and shows the focus of the 
planners on the prior zoning. 
That focus of the preliminary advisors is subsumed by the 
testimony of Mayor Walquist, a member of the town council that 
actually voted -- thereby taking the legislative action that 
placed the town's annexation and zoning into law. The following 
dialogue underscores the supremacy of the Town Council's vote 
over the musings of preliminary advisors. 
Q. As the town council, it's the town council who 
makes the final decisions on annexation and zoning; 
isn't that correct? 
A. Yes. 
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Q. And not the earlier advisors? 
A. No. They just submitted their recommendation 
to us. 
Q. And it's -- it's you who makes the final decision? 
A. Yes. 
(R. 989.) Further, the Mayor acknowledged that the statements he 
had made by affidavit were correct that Toquerville left the 
zoning of the Eveleth land the signs were on just as it was in 
the county. His testimony is as follows: 
THE COURT: Is that your signature, Mr. Wahlquist? 
THE WITNESS: Yes. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead, Mr. Finlayson. 
MR. FINLAYSON: May I have the document. 
Q. I'm going to read what is in this document and 
ask you if it's correct. The annexation of the 
property by the Town of Toquerville and the town's 
zoning of the property as commercial made no change in 
the zoning status of the property inasmuch as the 
property was zoned highway commercial both before and 
after the Toquerville zoning. Toquerville left the 
zoning of the Eveleth land the sigra are on just as it 
was when the land was only in the county. Is that 
correct? 
A. At that time, yes. See, that was part -- what's 
the date on that? 
Q. Oh, it's August 10, 1994. 
(R. 985.) 
That Toquerville merely perpetuated the prior Washington 
County zoning designation is the law of the case. The district 
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court found in earlier proceedings that "Toquerville retain[ed] 
the same zoning category the property had held when in the un-
incorporated area of Washington County."5 Kunz did not object to 
that finding of fact when the district court entertained 
counsel's argument on the proposed findings, except as to 
relevancy on the ground that the district court's ruling against 
res judicata made the statement irrelevant. Although the Court 
of Appeals reversed the district court's ruling on res judicata, 
the factual accuracy of the statement remained unassailed. (R. 
789-90.) 
Further, the Court of Appeals likewise stated as a fact that 
in "November of [1993] the town of Toquerville annexed Eveleth's 
property and chose to retain the "highway commercial" zoning for 
the area." 913 P.2d at 767. This perpetuation of the Washington 
County zoning action that the Court of Appeals held as a matter 
of law "was for the primary purpose of allowing outdoor 
advertising," 913 P.2d at 769, requires a conclusion that the 
5Fifth District Court's findings in earlier proceedings, R. 
595, 618, 619, 625. 
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signs are likewise unlawful under Toquerville's zoning. The 
district court's failure to follow the direction of the Court of 
Appeals to consider Toquerville's perpetuation of the prior 
zoning designation of Washington County was error. 
C. Failure to Consider Toquerville's Annexation and 
Zoning of Land at the Request of the Person on 
Whose Land the Signs Stood and Would Stand 
The owner of the land on which the signs would stand -- the 
lessor of the land to Kunz -- has an obvious financial interest 
in a zoning category that would accommodate signs. Thomas 
Eveleth is, and at all times relevant has been, the owner of that 
land. (R. 1043.) Then, we discover through one of Kunz•s own 
witnesses, the land was annexed and zoned by Toquerville at the 
request of none other than Thomas Eveleth and that the land would 
not have been annexed and zoned by Toquerville without the 
request of Mr. Eveleth. The following testimony was given: 
By a phone call Mr. Eveleth talked with the town 
clerk, Chester Adams, and requested that his additional 
property to the north of the proposed annexation be 
included in the annexation process, and that 
information must have been conveyed to me because I 
adjusted the boundary of the proposed annexation to 
include all of Mr. Eveleth's property as well as some 
additional property on the east side of 1-15. And so 
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that was the reason it was changed was because there 
was a formal --an informal request made. 
(R. 855-56.) 
Also: 
Q. Which is the property that was included at 
Eveleth's suggestion that would have not been included 
without that suggestion? 
A. Everything north of this section 27 and west of 
1-15 was requested by Tom Eveleth and his wife to be 
included in the annexation process. 
Q. Was there a portion of that that was not included 
in the original plan? 
A. Yes. 
Q. What part of that? 
A. Everything north of section 27 was originally not 
included in the annexation proposal. It was subsequent 
to his phone call, and I have a letter from him in my 
file now that verifies that he requested that 
additional property north of section 27 west of 1-15 be 
included in the annexation. 
(R. 876.) 
There is no question that the land annexed at the Eveleths 
request is the land the signs were and would be on: 
MR. RONNOW: Your Honor, in order -- following the 
Court's lead here to perhaps expedite this a little 
bit, plaintiffs are perfectly willing to stipulate that 
the three outdoor sign structures are located in the 
northwest triangular portion of Mr. Eveleth's property 
that appears on Exhibit 1 as the northwest side of 
Interstate 15 in the bump on the annexation at the very 
top of that annexation and their exact location, I 
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don't think, is necessarily too material. They are 
there. We don't dispute that. 
(R. 882-83.) 
That Eveleth's request was a sine qua non without which the 
land would not have been taken and zoned by Toquerville, is 
consistent with Mr. Sizemore's indication that one of three 
factors the planners considered was "the owners' desires." This 
evidence linking the signs to the annexation and zoning, through 
Mr. Eveleth, supports the conclusion that the zoning was for the 
"primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising." The trial 
court's failure to enter any finding regarding it -- an 
indication the court declined to consider it -- was error. 
D. Failure to Consider Tax Revenues From Signs 
In addition to the perpetuation of the zoning of the land by 
Washington County that was unlawful for signs under the UDOT 
remand order and Kunz & Co. v. State of Utah, 913 P.2d at 769, 
and the owner's desires, the third factor Mr. Sizemore said he 
considered was "potential tax base benefits." (R. 902. See 
also, R. 947 ("helping tax revenue of the Town of Toquerville").) 
As stated by the Court of Appeals: "In enacting section 27-12-
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136.3(3), the legislature must have contemplated that local 
zoning bodies might attempt to generate immediate revenue from 
lands adjacent to highways by rezoning such lands to allow 
outdoor advertising." 913 P.2d at 769. Thus, rezoning to 
commercial coupled with no commercial activity except for signs 
is significant circumstantial evidence of violation of section 
27-12-136.3(3). 913 P.2d at 769. 
Here, no commercial activity has ever been conducted on the 
land except for the signs, and, without culinary water or sewer 
and being at least 2000 feet from the intersection, the area of 
the signs does not have any reasonable prospect of commercial 
activity in the foreseeable future. Therefore, the only 
commercial activity on the land that met or could meet the object 
of the planners to "help[] tax revenue of the Town of 
Toquerville" (R. 947), is the signs. This circumstance supports 
the conclusion that the "primary purpose of [the zoning is] 
allowing outdoor advertising." 
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IV. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DISREGARDING AS UNWORKABLE 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 27-12-136.3(3) AFTER THE COURT OF 
APPEALS HAD IDENTIFIED THAT SECTION AS CONTROLLING AND 
DIRECTED THE DISTRICT COURT TO FOLLOW IT 
The Court of Appeals identified subsection 27-12-136.3(3) as 
controlling in connection with its discussion of the policy of 
the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act to preserve natural beauty of 
the lands adjacent to the highways. Further, the Court of 
Appeals directed the district court to consider certain objective 
factors that bear on whether an area is zoned for the primary 
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising in light of the 
Legislature's recognition that objective circumstances are likely 
to be more probative than subjective statements of intent of a 
zoning body. It was the duty of the district court to understand 
the Court of Appeals' decision and apply it. It was a violation 
of that duty, however creative or well-intentioned, for the 
district court to disregard the letter and spirit of the Court of 
Appeal's decision and embark on a journey of its own, as the 
above argument discloses it did. See Slattery v. Covey, 909 P.2d 
at 928 (quoting Thurston v. Box Elder County, 892 P.2d at 1037-
38)(requiring the lower court to "implement both the letter and 
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the spirit of the [appellate] court's mandate"). 
The district court's disregard of the controlling law is 
graphically illustrated by the following statement of the court 
in its oral presentation of findings of fact and conclusions of 
law: 
I observe parenthetically that the legislative use 
within 27-12-136.3 sub 3 of the phrase primary purpose 
of allowing outdoor advertising probably does not 
accomplish the intent -- the announced intent of the 
act or give any kind of reasonable framework within 
which courts may determine issues of these kinds. 
I would suspect that it would be a rare case if the 
Court could find evidence that the primary purpose was 
to build billboards. 
(R. 1068.) The district court's disregard was error and this 
Court should itself apply the law to the facts that were fully 
elucidated at trial and established the area as zoned for the 
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising. 
CONCLUSION 
The declaratory judgment of the district court should be 
vacated, and this Court should finally resolve this case by its 
own declaratory decision. The area is unlawful for signs under 
statutes and rules incorporating federal policy and under Utah 
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Code Ann. § 27-12-136.3(3) (1995) as construed by the Utah Court 
of Appeals. The evidence established that the area is "zoned for 
the primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising." Thus, the 
general prohibition of Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-136.4(1) (1995) 
renders the area unlawful for signs. This Court should so 
declare. 
/ / r / v 
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ADDENDUM A 
27-12-136.1 HIGHWAYS 
27-12-136.1. "Utah Outdoor Advertising Act"— Short title. 
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah Outdoor Advertising 
Act." 
History: L. 1967, ch. 51, 5 1. 
Meaning of "this act"— Laws 1967, ch. 51 
enacted 5$ 27-12-136.1 to 27-12-136.13. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS tween parties and was constructed without 
. objection by commission, and no procedure for 
Nonconforming use. paying just compensation for removal of sign 
Clte(1
- had been pursued by the state. National Adv. 
Nonconforming use. Co-v- U t a h S t a t e M - Comm'n, 26 Utah 2d 132, 
State could not compel removal of outdoor ^ 6 P-2d 383 (1971). 
advertising sign on ground that sign violated _.. . .
 TT, • T* ,A r « , « 
this act blcaSe advertising had Istablished . <?*** » Vf> * P * p * ^ P ; ? » • * • * 
prior nonconforming use and sign in question ° u * ° ° r A d v ' 
substantially complied with negotiations be- 1 9 8 8 ' -
27-12-136.2. Purpose of act. 
The purpose of this act is to provide the statutory basis for the regulation of 
outdoor advertising consistent with zoning principles and standards and the 
public policy of this state in providing public safety, health, welfare, conve-
nience and enjoyment of public travel, to protect the public investment in such 
highways, to preserve the natural scenic beauty of lands bordering on such 
highways, and to ensure that information in the specific interest of the 
traveling public is presented safely and effectively. 
The agreement entered into between the governor of the state of Utah and 
the secretary of transportation of the United States dated January 18, 1968, 
regarding the size, lighting and spacing of outdoor advertising which may be 
erected and maintained within areas adjacent to the interstate and primary 
highway systems which are zoned commercial or industrial or in such other 
unzoned commercial or industrial areas as defined pursuant to the terms of 
such agreement is hereby ratified and approved. 
History: L. 1967, ch. 51,1 2; 1971, ch. 61, Meaning of "this act" — See note under 
S I . § 27-12-136.1. 
27-12-136.3. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter: 
(1) "Commercial or industrial activities" means those activities gener-
ally recognized as commercial or industrial by zoning authorities in this 
state, except that none of the following are commercial or industrial 
activities: 
(a) agricultural, forestry, grazing, farming, and related activities, 
including wayside fresh produce stands; 
(b) transient or temporary activities; 
(c) activities not visible from the main-traveled way; 
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(d) activities conducted in a building principally used as a resi-
dence; and 
(e) railroad tracks and minor sidings. 
(2) "Commercial or industrial zone" means only: 
(a) those areas within the boundaries of cities or towns that are 
used or reserved for business, commerce, or trade, or zoned as a 
highway service zone, under enabling state legislation or comprehen-
sive local zoning ordinances or regulations; 
(b) those areas within the boundaries of urbanized counties that 
are used or reserved for business, commerce, or trade, or zoned as a 
highway service zone, under enabling state legislation or comprehen-
sive local zoning ordinances or regulations; 
(c) those areas outside the boundaries of urbanized counties and 
outside the boundaries of cities and towns that: 
(i) are used or reserved for business, commerce, or trade, or 
zoned as a highway service zone, under comprehensive local 
zoning ordinances or regulations or enabling state legislation; 
and 
(ii) are within 8420 feet of an interstate highway exit, off-
ramp, or turnoff as measured from the nearest point of the 
beginning or ending of the pavement widening at the exit from or 
entrance to the main-traveled way; or 
(d) those areas outside the boundaries of urbanized counties and 
outside the boundaries of cities and towns and not within 8420 feet of 
an interstate highway exit, off-ramp, or turnoff as measured from the 
nearest point of the beginning or ending of the pavement widening at 
the exit from or entrance to the main-traveled way that are reserved 
for business, commerce, or trade under enabling state legislation or 
comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations, and are actu-
ally used for commercial or industrial purposes. 
(3) "Commercial or industrial zone" does not mean areas zoned for the 
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising. 
(4) "Comprehensive local zoning ordinances or regulations" means a 
municipality's comprehensive plan required by Section 10-9-301, the 
municipal zoning plan authorized by Section 10-9-401, and the county 
master plan authorized by Sections 17-27-301 and 17-27-401. 
(5) "Department" means the Department of Transportation. 
(6) "Directional signs" means signs containing information about public 
places owned or operated by federal, state, or local governments or their 
agencies, publicly or privately owned natural phenomena, historic, cul-
tural, scientific, educational, or religious sites, and areas of natural scenic 
beauty or naturally suited for outdoor recreation, that the department 
considers to be in the interest of the traveling public. 
(7) (a) "Erect" means to construct, build, raise, assemble, place, affix, 
attach, create, paint, draw, or in any other way bring into being. 
(b) "Erect" does not include any activities defined in Subsection (a) 
if they are performed incident to the change of an advertising message 
or customary maintenance of a sign. 
(8) "Highway service zone" means a highway service area where the 
primary use of the land is used or reserved for commercial and roadside 
services other than outdoor advertising to serve the traveling public. 
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PRECONSTRUCTION, RIGHT OF WAY ACQUISITION R933-2-3 
R 9 3 3 . P r e c o n s t r u c t i o n , R i g h t o f W a y 
A c q u i s i t i o n . 
R933-1. Right of Way Acquisition. 
R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising Signs. 
R933-3. Relocation or Modification of Existing Authorized 
Access Openings or Granting New Access Openings on 
Limited Access Highways. 
R 9 3 3 - 1 . R i g h t o f Way A c q u i s i t i o n . 
R933-1-1. Right of Way Acquisition Incorporation of Fed-
eral Publication. 
R933-1-1. Right of Way Acquis i t ion Incorpora-
t ion of Federal Publ icat ion. 
The State of Utah incorporates by reference 49 
CFR 24 as amended in the Federal Register, March 
2, 1989, as i ts administrative rules on the acquisi-
tion of rights of way. 
References: 27-12-89 through 103. 
History: 13864, AMD, 01/14/93. 
R933-2. Control of Outdoor Advertising 
Signs. 
R933-2-1. Purpose. 
R933-2-2. Federal Regulations. 
R933-2-3. Definitions. 
R933-2-4. Permits. 
R933-2-5. Sign Changes, Repairs, and Maintenance. 
R933-2-6. Commercial and Industrial Usage: Limitations 
in Zoned or Unzoned Areas. 
R933-2-7. Spacing For Permitted Signs. 
R933-2-8. Removal of Illegal Signs. 
R933-2-9. lermination of Non-Conforming Use Status. 
R933-2-10. Conforming Sign Becoming Nonconforming — 
Removal. 
R933-2-11. On-Premise Signs — Illegal Status — Re-
moval. 
R933-2-12. Directional Signs. 
R933-2-13. Official Signs. 
R933-2-14. Department Hearings. 
R933-2-15. Prosecution for Violation of Act or Rules. 
R933-2-16. Saving Clause. 
R933-2-17. Effective Date. 
R933-2-1. Purpose . 
The purpose of these rules is to implement the 
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. Nothing in these 
rules shall be construed to permit outdoor advertis-
ing tha t would disqualify the State for Federal 
participation of funds under the Federal s tandards 
applicable. The Transportation Commission and the 
Utah Department of Transportation shall, through 
designated personnel, control outdoor advertising on 
interstate and primary highway systems. 
R933-2-2. Federal Regulat ions . 
The federal regulations governing outdoor adver-
tising contained in 23 CFR section 750.101 through 
section 750.713 (April 1, 1994) are adopted and 
incorporated by this reference. 
R933-2-3. Definit ions. 
All references in these Rules to Sections 27-12-
136.1 through 27-12-136.13, are to those sections of 
the Utah Code known as the Utah Outdoor Adver-
tising Act. In addition to the definitions in Section 
27-12-136.3, the following definitions are supplied: 
(1) "Abandoned Sign" means any controlled sign, 
the sign facing of which has been partially obliter-
ated, has been painted out, has remained blank or 
has obsolete advertising matter for a continuous 
period of twelve (12) months or more. 
(2) "Act" means the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. 
(3) "Advertising" means any message, whether in 
words, symbols, pictures or any combination thereof, 
painted or otherwise applied to the face of an out-
door advertising structure, which message is de-
signed, intended, or used to advertise or inform, and 
which message is visible from any place on the main 
travel-way of the interstate or primary highway 
system. 
(4) "Areas zoned for the primary purpose of out-
door advertising*' as used in Subsection 27-12-
136.3(3) of the Act is denned to include areas in 
which the primary activity is outdoor advertising. 
(5) "Commercial or industrial zone" as defined in 
Subsection 27-12-136.3(2)(d) of the Act is further 
defined to mean, with regard to those areas outside 
the boundaries of urbanized counties and outside 
the boundaries of cities and towns referred to in tha t 
subsection, such areas not within 8420 feet of an 
interstate highway exit-ramp or entrance-ramp as 
measured from the nearest point of the beginning or 
ending of the pavement widening at the exit from or 
entrance to the main traveled way that are reserved 
for business, commerce, or trade under enabling 
state legislation or comprehensive local zoning ordi-
nances or regulations, and are actually used for 
commercial or industrial purposes, including the 
land along both sides of a controlled highway for 600 
feet immediately abutt ing the area of use, measure-
ments under this subsection being made from the 
outer edge of regularly used buildings, parking lots, 
gate-houses, entrance gates, or storage or processing 
areas. 
(6) "Conforming Sign" means an off-premise sign 
maintained in a location that conforms to the size, 
lighting, spacing, zoning and usage requirements as 
provided by law and these rules. 
(7) "Controlled Sign" means any off-premise sign 
tha t is designed, intended, or used to advertise or 
inform any pa r t of the advertising or informative 
contents of which is visible from any place on the 
main traveled way of any interstate or federal-aid 
primary highway in this State. 
(8) "Destroyed Sign" means a sign damaged by 
na tura l elements wherein the costs of re-erection 
exceeds 30 percent of the depreciated value of the 
sign as established by departmental appraisal meth-
ods. 
(9) "Freeway* means a divided highway for 
through traffic with full control access. 
(10) "Grandfather Status" refers to any off-
premise controlled sign erected in zoned or unzoned 
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awarding the natural father his costs and 
attorney fees incurred after September 8, 
1993. See Schoney v. Memorial Estates, 
Inc., 863 P.2d 59, 62 (Utah App.1993) (hold-
ing no abuse of discretion awarding costs and 
attorney fees when sanctions were warrant-
ed). 
CONCLUSION 
We therefore affirm the sanctions imposed 
by the trial court and award the natural 
father his costs and attorney fees incurred on 
appeal. We remand the case to the trial 
court for a determination of the amount of 
the award on appeal. 
BILLINGS and GREENWOOD, JJ., 
concur. 
E KEY NUMBER SYSTEM S> 
KUNZ & COMPANY dba Kunz Outdoor 
Advertising, a California corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
STATE of Utah, Utah Department 
of Transportation, Defendant 
and Appellant. 
No. 950186-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 14, 1996. 
Outdoor advertising corporation sought 
order declaring signs on property adjacent to 
interstate highway to be in compliance with 
state law and providing injunctive relief. 
The Fifth District Court, Washington Coun-
ty, James L. Shumate, J., entered summary 
judgment for corporation. Department of 
Transportation appealed. The Court of Ap-
peals, Wilkins, J., held that: (1) property 
reserved for commercial or industrial use in 
city or town could be excluded from use for 
outdoor advertising near highway if zoning 
violated statute providing that "commercial 
or industrial zone" does not mean areas 
zoned for primary purpose of allowing out-
door advertising; (2) fact issues existed as to 
whether primary purpose behind rezoning of 
land was to allow outdoor advertising; (3) 
corporation was bound by order of Depart-
ment concerning signs; and (4) corporation 
was required to exhaust administrative reme-
dies with regard to obtaining renewal per-
mits before seeking order in district court 
providing declaratory and injunctive relief. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>863 
In considering appeal from summary 
judgment, Court of Appeals reviews trial 
court's legal conclusions, including its conclu-
sion that material facts are not disputed, for 
correctness. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>863 
Standard of review of summary judg-
ment allows Court of Appeals to make its 
own conclusions and does not obligate it to 
defer to trial court. Rules Civ.Proc, Rule 
56(c). 
3. Highways <3=153.5 
Area zoned for commercial or industrial 
use in city or town need not actually have 
commercial development on it to satisfy high-
way code's definition of "commercial or in-
dustrial zone" as including areas used or 
reserved for business. U.CA.1953, 27-12-
136.3(2)(a). 
4. Highways <3=>153.5 
Area zoned for commercial or industrial 
use in city or town which does not actually 
have commercial development on it may be 
excluded from use for outdoor advertising 
near highway if the zoning violates statute 
providing that "commercial or industrial 
zone" does not mean areas zoned for primary 
purpose of allowing outdoor advertising. 
U.CA1953, 27-12-136.3(3), 27-12-
136.4(l)(d). 
5. Zoning and Planning <3=>624 
In determining primary purpose behind 
particular zoning decision, fact finder can and 
should consider all relevant evidence, not just 
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stated purpose of zoning body or local gov-
ernment; this would include evidence of ac-
tual land use or any evidence that zoning 
body merely perpetuated prior zoning desig-
nation. 
6. Judgment <s>181(15.1) 
Issues of material fact existed as to 
whether primary purpose behind rezoning of 
land to commercial use was to allow outdoor 
advertising, such that land would be required 
by statute to be excluded from use for out-
door advertising, precluding summary judg-
ment. U.CA.1953, 27-12-136.3(3); Rules 
Civ.Proc, Rule 56(c). 
7. Highways <3=>157 
Outdoor advertising corporation was 
bound under doctrine of res judicata by or-
der of Department of Transportation con-
cerning removal of billboards, even though 
corporation had not been party to proceed-
ings in which order was issued, where corpo-
ration was privy to, and subsequent assignee 
of, corporation which had been party to such 
proceedings. 
8. Judgment <S=>681 
Court would not adopt test set forth in 
Restatement of Judgments (Second), provid-
ing various exceptions to applicability of res 
judicata to successor of property interest 
when that party is subject of pending litiga-
tion to which transferor of interest, rather 
than successor, is party. Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments § 44. 
9. Judgment <3>713(2), 720 
Res judicata applies only as to those 
issues which were either tried and deter-
mined, or upon all issues which party had 
fair opportunity to present and have deter-
mined in other proceeding. 
10. Highways <3=>153.5 
Although outdoor advertising corpora-
tion was bound under doctrine of res judicata 
by prior adjudication of Department of 
Transportation that county's zoning of land 
was for primary purpose of allowing outdoor 
advertising, it was not bound by any adjudi-
cation as to whether town's zoning was for 
primary purpose of allowing outdoor adver-
tising, since town's annexation and rezoning 
of land occurred nearly eight months after 
order was issued. U.CA.1953, 27-12-
136.3(3). 
11. Highways <S>153.5,157 
Regardless of whether outdoor advertis-
ing signs adjacent to highway were located in 
valid commercial or industrial zone, they 
were illegal and subject to removal where 
sign owner had not obtained valid permits for 
signs. U.CA.1953, 27-12-136.4(1 )(d), 27-12-
136.7(l)(a). 
12. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=>662 
Highways <3=>153.5,159(2) 
Outdoor advertising corporation was re-
quired to exhaust administrative remedies 
with regard to obtaining renewal permits for 
signs before seeking order in district court 
declaring signs to be in compliance with state 
law and providing injunctive relief; statute 
providing district courts with jurisdiction to 
review final orders of Department of Trans-
portation resulting from formal and informal 
adjudicative proceedings did not relieve cor-
poration from exhausting its administrative 
remedies, order denying permits was not fi-
nal order under such statute, and order did 
not result from formal and informal adjudica-
tive proceedings. U.CA.1953, 27-12-
136.9(4)(a). 
13. Administrative Law and Procedure 
<3=*662 
Highways <3=>153.5 
Where outdoor advertising corporation 
did not exhaust its administrative remedies 
with regard to sign permits, neither trial 
court nor Court of Appeals had jurisdiction 
to reverse, alter, or otherwise circumvent 
that particular agency action. U.CA.1953, 
63-46b-l(8). 
Appeal from Fifth District, Washington 
County; The Honorable James L. Shumate, 
Judge. 
Jan Graham and Ralph L. Finlayson, Salt 
Lake City, for Appellant. 
D. Williams Ronnow and John J. Walton, 
St. George, for Appellee. 
OPINION 
Before BILLINGS, JACKSON, and 
WILKINS, JJ. 
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UDOT revoked the per-
the signs' immediate re-
WILKINS, Judge: 
The Utah Department of Transportation 
(UDOT) appeals the district court's grant of 
summary judgment in favor of Kunz & Com-
pany. We reverse and remand. 
BACKGROUND 
Thomas Eveleth owns real property adja-
cent to Interstate 15 in Washington County, 
near the Anderson Junction. In March 1986, 
Eveleth applied to the county for a zoning 
change, seeking to change the zoning of his 
property from "agricultural" to "highway 
commercial." 
Prior to obtaining the zoning change, 
Eveleth entered into an agreement with 
Lundgren Outdoor Advertising (Lundgren) 
whereby Eveleth would lease his property to 
Lundgren for the purpose of placing and 
maintaining billboards on the property. In 
July 1987, Eveleth and Lundgren applied to 
UDOT for permits to construct three bill-
boards on the property along 1-15. Each 
application certified that "the sign is in full 
compliance with the [Outdoor Advertising] 
Act," and that Eveleth's property is zoned 
"commercial." In fact, the property was still 
zoned "agricultural" at the time. Neverthe-
less, UDOT granted the permits, and Lund-
gren proceeded to erect the three signs later 
that year. 
In March 1988, UDOT notified Lundgren 
that the property was not zoned "commer-
cial," as was claimed in the permit applica-
tions. Lundgren then notified Eveleth of 
this problem, and Eveleth took further steps 
to obtain the zoning change. 
In August 1989, UDOT held a hearing on 
the matter to determine the legality of the 
signs pursuant to the Utah Outdoor Adver-
tising Act (codified at that time at Utah Code 
Ann. §§ 27-12-136.1 to -136.13 (1989)). 
UDOT ruled that the three billboards violat-
ed sections 27-12-136.4, -136.9, and -136.3(3) 
because the billboards were located on prop-
erty that was not zoned "commercial" nor 
could be deemed such for purposes of out-
moval. 
Lundgren appealed the UDOT order to 
this court. However, in December 1989, dur-
ing pendency of the appeal, Washington 
County rezoned Eveleth's property as "high-
way commercial." After UDOT informed 
this court of the changed circumstances, we 
remanded the case to UDOT in April 1990. 
UDOT conducted further proceedings, 
which involved only the parties to the appeal, 
UDOT and Lundgren. Subsequently, in 
February 1993, UDOT issued a new order 
ruling that although Eveleth's property was 
now zoned "commercial," the rezoning was 
for the "primary purpose" of allowing out-
door advertising, thereby disqualifying the 
property for that use, pursuant to section 27-
12-136.3(3) of the Utah Code. 
UDOT sent the Order on Remand, which 
revoked the permits for the three signs and 
ordered their removal, to Lundgren and 
Eveleth. However, ownership of the signs 
had changed prior to the issuance of UDOT's 
final order. Two years earlier, in February 
1991, Kunz & Company (Kunz) had pur-
chased the billboards from Leonard & Com-
pany, a successor to Lundgren. 
In September 1993, UDOT sent a letter to 
Kunz explaining the illegality of the signs 
and providing a copy of the UDOT Order on 
Remand. Nevertheless, Kunz did not take 
any steps to intervene or appeal that order. 
Subsequently, in November of that year, 
the town of Toquerville annexed Eveleth's 
property and chose to retain the "highway 
commercial" zoning for the area. However, 
there is not now, nor has there ever been, 
any commercial development on the property 
other than the three billboards. 
On January 18, 1994, Kunz applied for 
renewal permits for the signs. UDOT de-
nied the application, and on February 16, 
Kunz filed an action for declaratory judg-
ment in district court. Kunz sought a decla-
ration from the trial court that "due to the 
annexation and rezoning of the subject prop-
erty, the billboards are now in compliance 
with applicable state law, specifically . . . the 
Utah Outdoor Advertising Act, and that re-
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moval of the billboards is not warranted 
thereunder." The parties also agreed to 
have the trial court determine "the effect [on 
Kunz] (if any) of the UDOT District Five 
'Order on Remand.'" Finally, Kunz sought 
permanent injunctive relief, enjoining UDOT 
and the State "from any removal of, or hin-
drance of Kunz's access to, the billboards." 
During the course of the proceedings, 
UDOT filed a motion for summary judgment, 
and Kunz filed a cross-motion for summary 
judgment. In December 1994, the trial court 
denied UDOT's motion and granted Kunz's 
cross-motion. Specifically, the trial court 
held that Kunz is not bound by UDOT's 
Order on Remand and that the three signs 
comply with the provisions of the Outdoor 
Advertising Act. UDOT appeals. 
ANALYSIS 
[1,2] As is the case whenever we consid-
er an appeal from a summary judgment, we 
review the trial court's legal conclusions, in-
cluding its conclusion that the material facts 
are not disputed, for correctness. See Utah 
R.Civ.P. 56(c) (stating that summary judg-
ment is appropriate only if "there is no genu-
ine issue as to any material fact and . . . the 
moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law"). This standard allows us to 
make our own conclusions and does not obli-
gate us to defer to the trial court. See State 
v. Penou 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
I. Application of Outdoor Advertising Act 
Kunz specifically asked the trial court to 
declare that "the billboards, as presently sit-
uated on [Eveleth's] property, lie within a 
bona fide commercial zone not created or 
existing for the primary purpose of outdoor 
advertising," which would qualify the area for 
billboards under the Outdoor Advertising 
Act. See Utah Code Ann. § 27-12-
136.4(l)(d) (1995). Pursuant to the Declara-
tory Judgment Act, "[a]ny person . . . affect-
ed by a statute . . . may have determined any 
question of construction or validity arising 
under the . . . statute . . . and obtain a decla-
ration of rights, status or other legal rela-
tions thereunder." Id. § 78-33-2 (1992). 
Thus, the trial court in this case could prop-
erly decide the issue. See id. § 78-33-1. 
The trial court concluded that the current 
zoning of Eveleth's land met the require-
ments of the Outdoor Advertising Act and 
thereby permitted the use of billboards on 
the property. In reaching this conclusion, 
the court specifically relied on the fact that 
Toquerville has zoned the area as "highway 
commercial." See id. § 27-12-136.4(1 )(d) 
(1995) (permitting the use of outdoor adver-
tising in a "commercial or industrial zone"). 
The court found this designation sufficient to 
fall within the statutory definition for such a 
zone as provided in the Outdoor Advertising 
Act. 
Section 27-12-136.3(2)(a) defines "[com-
mercial or industrial zone," in the relevant 
part, as "those areas within the boundaries of 
cities or towns that are used or reserved for 
business, commerce, or trade, or zoned as a 
highway service zone, under enabling state 
legislation or comprehensive local zoning or-
dinances or regulations." Id. § 27-12-
136.3(2)(a). In addition, a subsequent provi-
sion in the Act limits the definitions found in 
subsection (2) by establishing that "'[c]om-
mercial or industrial zone' does not mean 
areas zoned for the primary purpose of al-
lowing outdoor advertising." Id. § 27-12-
136.3(3). 
The trial court construed the use of the 
term "reserved" in subsection (2)(a) to mean 
that the property does not actually need to 
have commercial development on it, but that 
it merely be zoned for that purpose. Thus, 
the court determined that the current zoning 
of Eveleth's land satisfied the statute, despite 
the fact that the three signs represent the 
only commercial development on the proper-
ty. The trial court further concluded that 
the "exclusionary definition" in section 27-
12-136.3(3) referred only "to the areas out-
side incorporated cities and towns." 
[3,4] While we agree that an area zoned 
for commercial or industrial use in a city or 
town need not actually have commercial de-
velopment on it to satisfy the definition in 
section 27-12-136.3(2)(a), we conclude that 
such property may still be excluded from use 
for outdoor advertising if the zoning violates 
section 27-12-136.3(3). The trial court erred 
in deciding that this latter provision applied 
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only to areas outside of incorporated cities 
and towns. 
In enacting section 27-12-136.3(3), the leg-
islature must have contemplated that local 
zoning bodies might attempt to generate im-
mediate revenue from lands adjacent to high-
ways by rezoning such lands to allow outdoor 
advertising. However, allowing outdoor ad-
vertising in areas without other businesses or 
highway services in the vicinity would violate 
essential purposes of the Outdoor Advertis-
ing Act—enacted in part to promote the 
"convenience and enjoyment of public travel, 
to protect the public investment in such high-
ways, to preserve the natural scenic beauty 
of lands bordering on such highways, and to 
ensure that information in the specific inter-
est of the traveling public is presented safely 
and effectively." Id. § 27-12-136.2. Ac-
cordingly, if a zoning body designates specific 
land as "commercial" for the primary pur-
pose of allowing outdoor advertising on that 
land, then section 27-12-136.3(3) prohibits 
the use of billboards on the land regardless 
of whether or not the zoning body also in-
tends to "reserve" the land for other com-
mercial use. 
[5,6] Furthermore, in determining the 
primary purpose behind a particular zoning 
decision, the fact finder can and should con-
sider all relevant evidence, not just the stat-
ed purpose of the zoning body or local gov-
ernment. This would include evidence of 
actual land use or any evidence that the 
zoning body merely perpetuated a prior zon-
ing designation. Inasmuch as Kunz and 
UDOT have presented conflicting evidence as 
to Toquerville's primary purpose behind the 
zoning of Eveleth's land, we conclude that a 
genuine issue of material fact exists. We 
therefore reverse and remand for trial to 
allow the fact finder to determine the pri-
mary purpose for the zoning decision. 
II. Effect of Order on Remand 
UDOT argued before the trial court that 
UDOT's Final Order on Remand, issued in 
February 1993, constitutes an enforceable or-
der against Kunz and has res judicata effect 
on the issues of this case. In light of these 
arguments, Kunz and UDOT agreed to have 
the trial court decide what effect, if any, the 
Order on Remand has on Kunz and this case. 
The trial court ruled that because Kunz was 
not a party to the previous UDOT proceed-
ings and did not receive adequate legal notice 
of those proceedings, Kunz was not bound by 
the Order on Remand. 
[7] Nevertheless, the trial court failed to 
recognize the significance of the fact that one 
of Kunz's predecessors in interest, Lundgren, 
was a party to those proceedings. Res judi-
cata applies to the same parties and to their 
privies or assignees. DyAston v. Aston, 844 
P.2d 345, 350 (Utah App.1992). As a privy 
to, and subsequent assignee of, Lundgren's 
interests in the billboards, Kunz is bound by 
the UDOT Order on Remand to the same 
extent as Lundgren. The trial court erred in 
ruling otherwise. 
[8] Kunz proposes that we adopt the test 
set forth in the Second Restatement of Judg-
ments, which provides various exceptions to 
the applicability of res judicata to a successor 
of a property interest when that property is 
the subject of a pending litigation to which 
the transferor of the interest, rather than the 
successor, is a party. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Judgments § 44 (1982). Utah has 
not adopted the Restatement test, and we 
decline to do so now. 
[9,10] Even so, the Order on Remand is 
res judicata only " 'as to those issues which 
were either tried and determined, or upon all 
issues which the party had a fair opportunity 
to present and have determined in the other 
proceeding;" DAston, 844 P.2d at 350 
(quoting Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 767 
P.2d 121, 123 (Utah App.1988)). Kunz is 
therefore bound by the prior adjudication 
that Washington County's zoning of Evel-
eth's land was for the primary purpose of 
allowing outdoor advertising. However, this 
action involves a different set of facts, which 
have not been adjudicated: Whether Toquer-
ville's zoning, rather than Washington Coun-
ty's zoning, was for the primary purpose of 
allowing outdoor advertising. Toquerville's 
annexation and zoning of Eveleth's land oc-
curred nearly eight months after UDOT is-
sued its Order on Remand. Accordingly, the 
trial court was porrect to the extent it con-
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eluded that the Order on Remand was not 
binding on this particular issue. 
III. Further Relief Sought by Kunz 
As part of its declaratory action, Kunz also 
sought an order declaring the billboards to 
be in compliance with state law, declaring 
them exempt from any removal require-
ments, and granting permanent injunctive 
relief to prevent UDOT and the State from 
removing the signs. Under the Declaratory 
Judgment Act, a party may seek any further 
relief that is necessary or proper in light of 
the declaratory judgment issued by the trial 
court. Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-8 (1992). 
Nevertheless, the trial court cannot grant the 
relief asked for in this case. 
[11] Regardless of whether the signs are 
found to be located in a valid commercial or 
industrial zone, the signs are still illegal and 
subject to removal, because Kunz has not 
obtained valid permits for the signs. See id. 
§ 27-12-136.7(l)(a) (1995) ("Outdoor adver-
tising may not be maintained without a cur-
rent permit."); id. § 27-12-136.9(l)(b) 
("Outdoor advertising is unlawful when . . . a 
permit is not obtained as required by this 
chapter."). 
[12] In January 1994, Kunz applied to 
UDOT for renewal permits for the three 
billboards. When UDOT denied the applica-
tions, Kunz did not exhaust its administrative 
remedies, but instead filed this declaratory 
action in district court. Kunz claims that 
exhaustion of remedies is not required in this 
case because the state legislature has provid-
ed that "[t]he district courts shall have juris-
diction to review by trial de novo all final 
orders of the Department of Transportation 
under this section resulting from formal and 
informal adjudicative proceedings." Id 
§ 27-12-136.9(4)(a). 
However, Kunz's argument that section 
27-12-136.9 allows Kunz to proceed directly 
to district court for the relief sought is disin-
genuous. First, this section does not relieve 
Kunz from exhausting its administrative 
remedies. See id § 63-46b-14(2) (1993) ("A 
party may seek judicial review only after 
exhausting all administrative remedies avail-
able, except" under circumstances not appli-
cable to this case.). Furthermore, the 
UDOT order denying the permits is not a 
final order under this section, nor is Kunz 
seeking review of that order in this action. 
See id. § 27-12-136.9(4)(a) (1995). Most im-
portantly, the UDOT order denying the per-
mits is not a final order resulting from for-
mal and informal adjudicative proceedings 
as required under this section. See id. 
Once UDOT denied Kunz's applications for 
new permits, Kunz should have requested 
further agency action, seeking adjudicative 
proceedings to determine whether the per-
mits should have been granted in light of 
Toquerville's annexation and rezoning of 
Eveleth's property. See Utah Code Ad-
min.P. R907-1-3(B)(3) (indicating how adju-
dicative processes may be petitioned for by 
persons outside UDOT). UDOT's adminis-
trative rules specifically provide for adjudica-
tive proceedings pursuant to the Outdoor 
Advertising Act. Id R907-1-1 (A)(2). Such 
proceedings would commence informally and 
convert to formal proceedings if necessary. 
See id R907-1-KA), -5(F), & -15(B). In-
deed, Administrative Rule 907-l-15(B) spe-
cifically establishes: 
No final order is issued in the informal 
phase if there is a timely objection and 
request for hearing made. If such a time-
ly objection and request for hearing is 
made, the matter is treated as a contested 
case which is processed as a formal pro-
ceeding before the Director. Such right to 
have the matter be contested and pro-
cessed "formally" is an available and ade-
quate administrative remedy and should be 
exercised prior to seeking judicial review. 
Nevertheless, Kunz chose not to exhaust its 
administrative remedies following UDOT's 
denial of the new permits. Before Kunz 
could claim on appeal that UDOT erred in 
denying the permits, UDOT should have had 
the opportunity to correct the alleged error. 
See Mountain Fuel Supply Co. v. Public 
Serv. Comm% 861 P.2d 414, 423-24 (Utah 
1993) (recognizing that the correction princi-
ple underpins the doctrine of exhaustion of 
administrative remedies); see also Maverik 
Country Stores v. Industrial Comm'n, 860 
P.2d 944, 947 (Utah App.1993) ("The basic 
purpose underlying the doctrine . . . 'is to 
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allow an administrative agency to perform ing Act because 
functions within its special competence—to 
make a factual record, to apply its expertise, 
and to correct its own errors so as to moot 
judicial controversies.'" (quoting Parisi v. 
Davidson, 405 U.S. 34, 37, 92 S.Ct. 815, 818, 
31 L.Ed.2d 17 (1972))). 
[13] Because Kunz did not exhaust its 
administrative remedies with regard to the 
sign permits, neither the trial court nor this 
court has jurisdiction to reverse, alter, or 
otherwise circumvent that particular agency 
action. See Maverik Country Stores, 860 
P.2d at 947-48; see also Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-l(8) (Supp.1995) ("Nothing in this 
chapter may be interpreted to provide an 
independent basis for jurisdiction to review 
final agency action.") Accordingly, the trial 
court cannot order UDOT to grant the per-
mits. Without the permits, the billboards 
are illegal, and the trial court is without 
jurisdiction to change the signs' legal status 
and grant the further relief requested by 
Kunz in its declaratory action. See Utah 
Code Ann. § 7&-33-8 (1992) ("Further relief 
based on a declaratory judgment or decree 
may be granted when necessary or proper. 
The application therefor shall be by petition 
to a court having jurisdiction to grant the 
relief." (emphasis added)). 
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Kunz did not exhaust its 
administrative remedies following UDOT's 
denial of the new sign permits. The trial 
court cannot exempt the billboards from re-
moval requirements or grant the injunctive 
relief requested in this action. 
Reversed and remanded. 
BILLINGS and JACKSON, JJ., concur. 
O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
STATE of Utah, In the Interest of E.K., a 
person under eighteen years of age. 
K.K., Appellant, 
STATE of Utah, Appellee. 
No. 950292-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 14, 1996. 
CONCLUSION 
The trial court erred in concluding that 
section 27-12-136.3(3) applies only to areas 
outside incorporated cities and towns. Out-
door advertising is prohibited in any location 
zoned for the "primary purpose of allowing 
outdoor advertising." Because Kunz and 
UDOT have presented conflicting evidence 
regarding Toquerville's primary purpose be-
hind its zoning of Eveleth's land, we reverse 
the grant of summary judgment and remand 
for a trial on that issue. 
The trial court also erred in concluding 
that the UDOT Order on Remand has no 
binding effect on Kunz. Nevertheless, res 
judicata does not bar adjudication of the new 
issue presented in this action. 
Finally, the trial court is without jurisdic-
tion to declare the billboards to be in com-
plete compliance with the Outdoor Advertis-
Infant was determined to be neglected 
child by the Third District Juvenile Court, 
Salt Lake County, Olof A. Johansson, J. 
Mother appealed. The Court of Appeals, 
Billings, J., held that: (1) after-born child 
may be "neglected" based on abuse of sib-
lings; (2) state established prima facie case 
of neglect based on abuse of siblings; and (3) 
challenge to state's use to judicial notice was 
not preserved for appeal. 
Affirmed. 
Orme, P.J., concurred in part and con-
curred only in result in part. 
1. Infants @=>156 
For purposes of statute defining "ne-
glected or abused child" as child who is at 
risk of being neglected or abused because 
another child in the same home was neglect-
ed or abused, children "in the same home" is 
not limited to children actually present in 
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IN THE FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WASHINGTON COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
KUNZ & COMPANY dba KUNZ 
OUTDOOR ADVERTISING, a California FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Corporation, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Plaintiff, : 
vs. : Civil No. 94050322 
THE STATE OF UTAH AND THE UTAH : 
STATE DEPARTMENT OF Judge James L. Shumate 
TRANSPORTATION, : 
Defendant. 
The above-entitled matter came on before the Court on October 1, 1996, for a bench trial 
pursuant to remand from the Utah Court of Appeals. Plaintiff was represented by counsel D. 
Williams Ronnow. Defendants were represented by counsel Ralph L. Finlayson. The Court 
received testimony and evidence regarding the issue on remand, and now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The property in question, owned by Thomas Eveleth, located west of Interstate 15 in 
the northernmost limits of the town of Toquerville, Washington County, was annexed by the Town 
in 1992. 
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2. Beginning in January 1993, Toquerville town undertook the process of master-
planning its entire community and enlisted the assistance of the Five County Association of Govern-
ment1 s planner, the town engineer, and solicited the input of all property owners. 
3. The three signs in question in this lawsuit had been on the Eveleth property since 
1987. 
4. The only use of the Eveleth property since 1987 has been for outdoor advertising 
signage. 
5. There is no evidence of any utility ever servicing the property - water, power, gas, 
sanitary sewer or other utilities. 
6. The Court finds from Exhibit 1 and testimony, the Town of Toquerville, is separated 
into two distinct areas, one south of a high ridge that blocks the view of Anderson Junction from the 
traditional "Main Street" area, and one north and west of the high ridge which constitutes the 
annexed area and includes Anderson Junction and the 1-15 interchange. 
7. Unrebutted testimony was presented without objection that it was the purpose of the 
Town in establishing its master plan, zoning ordinance, zoning districts and its zoning map, that 
commercial zoning be limited to two distinct areas. One, a tiny parcel located at the south end of 
the Town on state highway U-17 that leads toward LaVerkin, Utah, and the other parcel immediately 
surrounding the Anderson Junction 1-15 interchange in the north end of Toquerville. 
8. The Court finds from Exhibit 2, it was the intent of Toquerville Town, because it 
incorporated its planning and zoning to match up with the existing zoning ordinance, that any 
signage of the type involved in this litigation be permissible only by conditional use permit. The 
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Town ordinance so provides, and it was the clear intention of the Town in this annexation to 
substantially limit outdoor advertising signs by that process. 
9. The Court heard evidence and testimony of the intent of the Town from the former 
mayor, the former chairman of the planning commission at the time these actions were undertaken, 
and from the former town engineer, and while such testimony provides some assistance in the 
Court's determination of these facts, the most telling evidence of Toquerville's intent with respect to 
outdoor advertising signs is the Toquerville Zoning Ordinance itself. 
10. Due to the fact that the placement of outdoor advertising signs within the Eveleth 
property after Toquerville annexed and zoned the subject property could only be done by conditional 
use permit, the Court cannot find that the primary purpose of the zoning was to allow outdoor 
advertising signage. 
11. The primary purpose of Toquerville's zoning action, designating the subject property 
as Highway Commercial, was to keep the commercial development away from the traditional 
downtown Main Street area of Toquerville and isolate the traditional downtown area from the 
property zoned commercial near the 1-15 Anderson Junction interchange and increase the tax revenue 
of the town from an expanded commercial base. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The designation of the Highway Commercial zone at the Anderson Junction 1-15 interchange 
by the Toquerville Town Council on December 14, 1993, was not for the primary purpose of 
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allowing outdoor advertising, and therefore does not violate UCA § 17-12-136.3(3) (Supp. 1988). 
DATED this _3_ day of NoYcmbcrrl996. 
BY THE 
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Fifth Distric 
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Assistant Attorney General 
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Attorney General 
Attorneys for Defendant 
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The Court having received testimony and evidence regarding the issue on remand, and having 
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on December 4, 1996. 
NOW, WHEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and 
DECREED that the designation of the Highway Commercial Zone at Anderson Junction 1-15 
Interchange by the Toquerville Town Council on December 14, 1993, was not for the 
primary purpose of allowing outdoor advertising, and therefore does not violate Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-12-136.3(3) (Supp. 1988) 
DATED this J? X^day of January, 1997. 
JUDGEMENT ENTERED 
Dsts:>29^7 
Timo: 
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